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To assess the contribution of recent French thought to democratic theory, this paper discusses 
Derrida’s ‘democracy to come’ in relation to a quasi-transcendental account of the constitution 
of meaning and identity in terms of an excess of time named the future to come. This re-
conceptualization of democracy cannot escape the affirmation of normative commitments, a 
commitment to futural openness that stands in need of  justification. Derrida’s intent to expose 
ineluctable aporias and contradictions of democratic decision-making disallows what Habermas 
calls a transcendental-pragmatic argument to the effect that we ought to be open to the future 
because the openness of the future is always necessarily presupposed by our symbolic practices. 
However, Derrida’s insistence on unavoidable contradictions and aporias can provide a weak 
normativity if this insistence is viewed as aiming at the reduction of violence. I conclude by 
showing that Derrida tends to overreach the normativity he can justify, in particular in regard to 
the relatively neglected democratic values of economic and political equality. 
 
      
Many commentators on democracy’s recent crisis of legitimization agree that the modern 
processes of ‘secularization’ and ‘disenchantment’ have divested democracies of its traditional 
normative foundations that tied modern democracy to Enlightenment ideas of emancipation. The 
increasing recognition of contingency and the closure of the ‘metaphysics of presence’ have cast 
doubt on the centrality of the rational subject, on natural law and foundations of human rights, on 
ideas of progress, and so on. While some theorists seek either to abandon (Schumpeter, Downs) 
or re-found (Habermas, Rawls) democracy’s normative footing, others affirm even those 
processes that have eroded it. They argue that secularization – due to its inherent suspicion of 
religious foundations, tradition, and the affirmation of a contingent and open future – should be 
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seen as a chance for democracy, rather than as its demise. The loss of metaphysical foundations 
confirms the requirement of radical contingency – and, on a liberal view, the public neutrality 
with regard to questions of the good life – for democratic politics.1 Since democracy historically 
grew out of the dissolution of extra-politically fixed identities and interpretive models, increasing 
disenchantment offers political identity-formation and group-building, as well as the 
interpretation of basic democratic concepts (e.g., equality, liberty), up to the public discussion 
and rewriting among diverse and heterogeneous groups. In the resulting open field, the rational 
foundations which philosophy traditionally supplied as a (universal) force of unity are replaced 
by structures of a heterogeneous and open kind. It is precisely the ungrounded nature of 
democratic practices – the vacancy of the site of power, as Lefort put it– that makes them what 
they are. Secularization and disenchantment bring democracy into its own. 
Jacques Derrida’s recent forays into democratic thought might be seen as a prominent 
and sophisticated version of this approach. For Derrida not only affirms the absence of a pre-
given (natural, theological, or transcendental-pragmatic, procedural) universality of norms that 
could support democracy. He suggests that the affirmation of a radically open future—a future 
that undermines metaphysical foundations—entails its own intrinsic normativity, a normativity 
that is helpful in reconceiving democracy. It is this claim that I will scrutinize here. Derrida 
argues that we can deconstruct the metaphysical, often rationalistic foundations of Western 
modernity while still holding on to the promises of the Enlightenment, one of which is the idea 
of democracy. Contrary to the liberal pragmatism of Rorty, however, Derrida does not consider 
the retention of the democratic promise a merely strategic, pragmatic decision among a range of 
alternatives; rather, he thinks we should avoid any empiricism and rethink the very nature of 
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promising itself. In this way, secularization might not only represent a chance for democracy, but 
also point to its very condition of possibility.  
Derrida indicates this argument in a phrase he has used frequently in his recent, more 
explicitly moral and political writings: democracy to come. In order to understand what la 
démocratie à venir – what Derrida calls “a democracy that must have the structure of a promise”2 
– might mean, I will first turn briefly to Derrida’s account of the temporal constitution of 
meaning and identity and what might be called the promise of repetition, a repetition from a 
structurally open-ended future. After this brief explication of the ‘to-come’ part of ‘democracy to 
come,’ I will then take up the relationship Derrida asserts between democracy and his 
understanding of time and its futurity. In section two, I will discuss three features that suggest a 
stong relation between democracy and the quasi-transcendental account of repetition from the 
future. I will show in section three that this relation cannot escape affirming certain normative 
commitments of democratic practices, and investigate the justification of the claim that we ought 
to be open to the future. In the fourth section, I will argue that Derrida’s reformulation of 
democratic practices and their undeniable normativity cannot be argumentatively grounded in a 
quasi-transcendental account of the future to-come (the promise) without relying on the 
normative idea of the ‘lesser violence.’ Derrida cannot draw on what Habermas calls a 
transcendental-pragmatic argument to the effect that we ought to be open to the future and its 
otherness because the openness of the future is always necessarily presupposed in our identity 
and practices. Such an argument presupposes the prohibition of performative contradictions that 
are disallowed by Derrida’s insistence on unavoidable contradictions and aporias. To try another 
route of justification, I consider in section five the consequentialist argument that openness to the 
future reduces violence and argue that this route, despite the many problems of defining and 
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measuring violence, could provide an – albeit weak – normative link between democracy and an 
open-ended future. The last section reflects on uses of Derrida’s notion of democracy that are in 
danger of overreaching its justified normativity, in particular in relation to capitalist markets. 
 
I 
What, then, is the structure of the promise that, according to Derrida, democracy must have? It 
might help to begin on the negative path and say what the structure of the promise is not. While 
the notion of democracy contains a number of specific, contentful promises – say, the promise of 
equal share in popular sovereignty, however this is understood – the structure of the promise here 
does not refer to any specific identifiable content. In other words, it is not a promise whose 
fulfillment at some future point in time can be expected, foreseen, or described. Democracy to 
come does not name a future democracy, nor is its promise ever embodied by an empirical 
political regime. The promise will always remain a promise. The ‘always’ here already indicates 
that we are no longer at the empirical level of promises made by identifiable subjects, but at an 
‘ontological’ or, as Derrida prefers to call it, ‘hauntological’ or ‘quasi-transcendental’ level: we 
are talking about the “being-promise of a promise” [l’être-promesse d’une promesse].3 This level 
puts into question the identity of a subject that would constitute a promise, or (according to 
Nietzsche) be constituted by its ability to make promises. Rather, the different senses of identity 
(the subject, content, and meaning of the promise) presupposed in empirical promising are 
looked at from the perspective of what makes them possible, a perspective that takes us beyond 
present identity and the homogenous chain of presents on which empirical promising seems to 
depend. 
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For Derrida, identity (including the identity of a subject, of meaning, and of the present) 
is constituted in an open-ended process of repetition. This open-endedness indicates the relation 
to the future named in the phrase ‘to come.’ Insofar as the (minimal) identity accomplished by 
the process of repetition is never final but continuously requires renewed repetition to be what it 
is (or to be otherwise), it is deferred to a future that never arrives as such. As is well known, 
Derrida’s neologism différance tries to capture this deferral of repetition as economically as 
possible, for it names both the movement of repetition in difference and that of deferral. The 
movement of repetition ‘promises’ the establishment of an identity that, however, is constantly 
undermined and referred again to repetition. Thus, no final and closed identity is ever 
accomplished by repetition. Repetition promises what it constitutes to a future that always defers 
its ‘itself,’ that never comes as such, in full presence, but only in the form of the provisional, 
minimal, and internally differentiated moments of an incomplete, fragile identity. The promise of 
repetition is (logically and temporally) prior to the identity that thus has to remain in process. For 
this reason, we can say that everything begins with a promise, a promise that never took place as 
such. This is what is meant by the ‘being-promise of a promise,’ for it spells out the quasi-
transcendental condition of possibility of empirical promising, by constituting the subject and the 
content it promises. As part of repetition that generates (and is prior to) subjectivity in the first 
place, the promise is directed toward the utterly indeterminable aspect of the future beyond 
horizons of expectation, planning, or awaiting.  
Thus, for Derrida, the ‘promise’ of the future precedes us and yet opens the future. The 
alterity and non-presence of this future is such that it cannot be restricted to a particular domain 
of beings or appearances, nor can it be conceptualized. It is not a horizon of expectation or of 
determinate possibilities projected onto the future (such as a democratic utopia), but precisely 
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names what I would call the blind spot in any horizon whereby it gives way to other horizons, 
other hopes and interpretations. Every interpretation of a history or a lineage, and thus every 
identity of meaning or of a constituted subject (e.g., of a nation), is projected onto the future. 
Since it may be criticized or revised by rival interpretations, the meaning of histories and 
traditions is always open to the future. This future is not beyond ‘history,’ but names precisely 
the infinite movement in which histories and identities constitute themselves. Keeping these 
structural features in mind – features that I do not wish to explicate or argue for here – let us look 
at what they imply for an understanding of democracy. 
 
II 
This structure of the promise, and the openness of the future it implies, form the background to 
Derrida’s notion of the ‘democracy to come.’ The phrase suggests a link between democracy and 
the promise of a future to come, an unownable and unknowable future. What is this link?  
Derrida’s explications of this notion lend themselves to two different (but not mutually 
exclusive) interpretations, a weak one and a strong one. On the weaker interpretation, the 
structure of the promise is viewed as underlying any concept, identity, or political structure, 
insofar as it is constituted by repetitions from the future: nothing specific about democracy 
would allow, or call for, the addition of the qualifier ‘to come.’ The stronger interpretation  
suggests that democracy, as a distinct political regime as much as a certain political experience, 
demands, more than other forms of political organization and practice, the exposure to an open-
ended future indicated in the ‘to come.’ In what follows, I will concentrate on the stronger 
interpretation, as it is, I believe, the one Derrida has in mind. 
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In Derrida’s writing, I find three major features of democracy that suggest that 
democracy, in contradistinction to other political formations, practices, and experiences, 
demands its association with the deconstructive and quasi-transcendental theory of an open 
future. If democracy is to be thought, it must be thought as a democracy to come. All three of 
these features are distinctive of modern democracy, and may be linked to modernization 
processes. (This is significant, I think, because the – normative – affirmation of an open future 
may itself be viewed as inseparable from such processes. I will return to this below, if only 
briefly.) 
 
(1) The first of these stronger links between democracy and the ‘to come’ comes when Derrida 
associates the idea of a democracy to come with infinite perfectibility, a perfectibility and 
infinity necessarily implied by ‘democracy.’4  The notion of infinity, of unavoidable 
incompletion, translates the (perhaps exclusively) democratic insight that no political principle or 
system, no law or universal ethics, can by itself be simply called just, precisely because of its 
universality and its place among the powers that be. For universality has to be applied to the 
singular that always, in the final analysis, eludes it. Furthermore, all institutionalized power owes 
itself to an ultimately unjustifiable instituting violence, a power that will always have had to 
exclude some in favor of others.5 Ultimately uncodifiable and without guarantee, justice, then, 
has to remain to come, against all desire for a good conscience. In other words, justice has to be 
what I would call a post-utopian promise that will never be fulfilled as such. This line of 
reasoning forms the thrust of Derrida’s critique of Fukuyama’s claim that Western liberalism has 
become the sole incarnation of justice as the ‘end of history’ after the breakdown of the Soviet 
Union.6 Justice, in its link to uncodifiable and uninstitutionalizable singularity, can neither be 
 8 
fully captured by empirical reality, nor by a political ideal, the two poles between which 
Fukuyama wavers. Rather, justice must be tied to a necessary disadequation between ideal and 
reality, for it is in the space between them that opportunities for perfectibility open up. 
According to Derrida’s argument, democracy to come indicates that democracy harbors 
this promise of infinite perfectibility, the promise to perfect it and go on criticizing its instituted 
form:  
 
This doesn’t mean that ‘democracy to come’ will be simply a future democracy correcting or 
improving the actual conditions of the so-called democracies, it means first of all that this 
democracy we dream of is linked in its concept to a promise. The idea of a promise is inscribed in 
the idea of a democracy: equality, freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press – all these 
things are inscribed as promises within democracy. Democracy is a promise. That is why it is a 
more historical concept of the political – it’s the only concept of a regime or a political 
organization in which history, that is the endless process of improvement and perfectibility, is 
inscribed in the concept. So it’s a historical concept through and through, and that is why I call it 
‘to-come.’7 
 
Here then, democracy as a regime or a political formation (but perhaps also as an experience) is 
linked to the promise of repetition. The link is achieved by the notion of history, and seems to 
rely on modern forms of historical consciousness: as opposed to other political formations, 
democracy is aware of its perfectibility (and, we would have to add, the possibilities of its 
degeneration) in history, thus opening and exposing itself to the messianic future. In this way, 
democracy admits its constitutive incompleteness, the deferral of full presence to a future that 
remains to come forever, and thus its historicity (which, as I indicated above, is constituted by 
the exposure to repetition from the future). In other words, the future to come indicates that all 
sedimented institutions and political relations owe themselves to historical decisions (rather than 
to natural frontiers) and thus may be returned to their undecidability. In the Politics of 
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Friendship, Derrida refines this thought by arguing that democracy harbors in itself the self-
deconstructive force characterized by the messianic promise: “no deconstruction without 
democracy, no democracy without deconstruction…. Democracy is the autos of deconstructive 
self-delimitation.”8 We may translate this by saying that democracy needs the self-deconstruction 
of its most basic concepts and institutions (so that democratic societies remain open to challenge 
and perfection), while deconstruction, as a textual operation, needs the democratic rights “to the 
question, to criticism, to deconstruction.”9  
 
(2) With this mention of the institutionally guaranteed right to free speech, we have moved on to 
the second, distinctively futural feature of democracy. Derrida points out that if one criticizes 
democracy – for example, for its traditional exclusion of the ‘sister’ from its fraternal order, for 
its distinction between the natural-born member and the outsider, for its law of filiation – one 
does so in the name of democracy, in the name of a democracy to come.10 Even if one criticizes 
democracy itself, one is authorized to do so (and thus already encompassed) by democracy. For 
democracy, by granting the right to free speech, free assembly, and a free press, is the form of 
political organization that calls for its own critique and that admits the fundamental revisability, 
and openness to challenge, of its own self-understanding. With this admission, democracy opens 
up a space between its actual condition and its future space – which may or may not be a 
regulative ideal11 – and situates itself between the present present and the future present, between 
presence and the messianic, absolute future. It is this space, this u-topic space between the 
present and the future, that la démocratie à venir delineates, by opening up a space in which the 
definition of the ideal, and of the meaning of such fundamental terms as freedom and equality, 
remains open-ended.  
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This democratic and atopical (non-present) space may also be viewed as a polemical 
space. The promise of repetition, and the open-endedness of the future to come, keeps the values 
and institutional structures open to different interpretations of what democracy means, thus 
allowing multiple voices to clash and negotiate with one another. The thinking of the messianic 
or absolute future could thus support the space or field in which this polemos, this clash, is to 
take place. It might serve as a reminder that the other, and the other others, be heard, both from 
within oneself and from the outside. The ‘to come’ would put a question mark behind everything 
put forward under the heading of ‘democracy’ – for instance, by referring to allegedly ‘natural’ 
and hence unquestionable rights. Further, it might help to prevent the ossification of interpreted 
values and the closing of possibilities: the supreme democratic virtue would be to question 
oneself before questioning others. (The messianic future is opposed to liberal good conscience.) 
But the messianic future, on Derrida’s view, would also keep democratic structures, such as 
equality and the always universal law, open to an appeal from singularity, interrupting the 
universal-juridical framework to let the justice of singularity come forth. In this way, democracy 
would be enabled to face and thus negotiate its inescapable aporias, first and foremost hospitality 
and openness to the singular other and the equality of all. (We will return to the question of 
aporia in a moment.) 
For purposes of clarification, this deconstructive space of discourse may be compared to 
Habermas’s understanding of the requirements of democratic discourse. On Derrida’s view, the 
polemical space of democratic decision-making is opposed to a notion of deliberative democracy 
that specifies normative procedural criteria in advance. In the name of intelligibility and common 
sense, Derrida fears, a homogenous medium, a universal model of language, may be 
superimposed on the radically open forms of democratic discussion and questioning. Thus, the 
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polemical open-endedness of discussion may be construed as a deconstructive rejoinder to a 
discourse-ethical account of democratic deliberation: it would be a democratic discourse 
governed by openness, infinity, and the possibility of unsurpassable dissension that requires 
compromise rather than by normative rules given as universal and geared toward transparency 
and consensus.12 In addition, Derrida claims – perhaps a bit hastily – that discursive norms 
program decisions, neutralize the event as the arrival of singularity, paralyze much-needed 
inventiveness, and thereby rule out responsibility as the relation to the otherness of the other.13 
 
(3) The open-endedness of discussion, however, also implicates the subjects engaged in such 
political discussion, for their identities are as much exposed to the radical futurity of time as are 
the topics of discussion. With this insight, we have moved on to what I would isolate as the third 
feature permitting a strong link between democracy and this futurity. Apart from historicity, 
perfectibility, and the ‘freedom to say anything and everything’ linking democracy and the to 
come, we must also take account of the symbolic space of (specifically) modern democracy. 
Given the theory of repetition from the open future, and the resulting relationality, open-
endedness, instability, and lack of arché and telos of any identity, the link between self-
deconstruction (and its temporality) and democracy can also be described by focusing on the 
constitutive and admitted openness of the democratic political field, as opposed to pre-modern 
forms of social organization that relied on references to extra-political instances to ground and 
center the political order.14 This might also connect democracy to come with the basic 
democratic idea of popular sovereignty. The sovereign’s identity – that is, the identity of ‘the 
people’ – is not fixed, and in principle (at least) cannot be determined other than by the 
interpretations and continuous re-identifications of the people themselves. Democratic unity and 
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sovereignty are thus inherently unstable, internally and infinitely differentiated, and open to 
never-ending contestation. In other words, democracy opens itself by itself to the infinite 
repetition from the future: democracy is always a democracy to come. A turn to the open future 
as democracy’s own implication, and the resulting recognition of the contingency and instability 
of a nation and its borders, would imply an originary dislocation of the ‘natural’ community, the 
native place, and the nation-state. This regard for ineluctable futural openness ushers in a politics 
of hospitality, a rethinking of immigration policies and citizenship.15 
 
III 
Having shown the ways in which modern democracy may be connected to Derrida’s 
understanding of the radical futurity of time, let me now investigate the normative dimension of 
the relation between democracy and the ‘to come.’ Since ‘democracy to come’ links a political 
concept – whose assertion or defense implies a number of normative commitments – to a quasi-
transcendental or quasi-ontological one, we must ask what these normative commitments are, 
and whether they are grounded in, or supported by, the arguments regarding the inescapability of 
a structural opening. It is noticeable, of course, that both the quasi-transcendental and the 
normative-political are concerned with futural openness. Given this structural homology, one 
might think that traditional demarcations between fact and value do not apply here. The 
swiftness with which Derrida at times (see below) moves from what used to be called an 
‘ontological’ to a ‘normative’ claim might indeed be taken to indicate that he does not recognize 
a fundamental distinction here, and it is certainly true that deconstruction has delimited the 
pertinence of the classical distinction and hierarchy between ontology and epistemology, on the 
one hand, and ethics and politics, on the other.16 Furthermore, we might say that in the absence 
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of non-inherited normative criteria, political interventions can only be justified strategically. And 
above, we have seen that the quasi-transcendental understanding of the promise of repetition, and 
the concomitant notion of an absolute or messianic future, imply the historicity of politics, that 
is, its inescapable inscription in inherited discourses. In explicating the strong link between 
democracy and this future, we elaborated this inscription further in terms of the non-
groundedness of democratic identities and institutions. In this sense, it is not only the case that 
deconstruction does not attempt to ground democracy in extra-political, non-inherited norms, but 
that the qualifier ‘to come’ renders untenable any such derivation or grounding and the 
ahistorical legitimization that it has traditionally implied.  
So Derrida might be taken to claim only that, if subjects in the Western states are 
committed to democracy – a concept and a practice we have inherited, and so can only, as with 
any heritage, “reaffirm by choosing” different strains and interpretations of its tradition17 – we 
should be aware that this affirmation and choosing are necessarily undertaken as a differential 
repetition from an open future. On this view, the normative commitments of democratic practice 
are simply implied by – and by no means necessarily follow from – a certain given historical 
situatedness in the West, whereas the affirmation of the open future is implied in the unavoidable 
practice of filtering through the historical situation. This view of the relation between the quasi-
transcendental and the normative levels coincides with what I called a weak interpretation of the 
link between democracy and the future to come. 
If my demonstration that Derrida affirms a stronger link is correct, however, it should be 
clear that the unavoidable practice of inheriting from an open future has some close affinities  
with what is inherited in this case, namely, democracy. This seems to single out democracy as 
more attuned to the work of inheritance by way of repetition from the future. It seems undeniable 
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that Derrida’s reformulation of democracy does not affirm just any form of political 
organization, and not even just any strains and interpretations of the democratic heritage. For 
example, Derrida’s democracy to come appears much less defined by popular sovereignty, 
equality, and majority rule – although Derrida recognizes their importance18 – than by free 
speech, openness to criticism and otherness, and hospitality to singularity. This shows, then, that 
Derrida’s concept of democracy selectively inherits and reformulates those features that show a 
structural homology between the normative and the quasi-transcendental levels, and that are cut 
to fit the deconstructive understanding of identity-formation, of time and space, and so on. In this 
way, Derrida is led not only to the unavoidable affirmation of historicity and futural openness – 
an affirmation which he says is affirmation itself19 – but to affirm a certain type of democracy 
involving the commitment to free speech, to hearing the other out, to being open to challenges 
regarding the interpretation of essential concepts, to criticize and perfect institutions with a view 
toward singularity and otherness, etc., in short, to what Derrida routinely affirms as his gloss on 
the emancipatory project of the Enlightenment.20 And these more specific, undoubtedly 
normative affirmations seem neither to be analytically contained in concepts of ‘democracy’ – so 
that a commitment to democracy necessarily implies a commitment to them – nor do they, in any 
obvious way, follow from the promise of repetition.  
It should come as no surprise, then, that Derrida is quite willing to use the normative 
language of ‘ought’ and ‘duty’ in his discussion of messianic and democratic experience. The 
normative commitments that are involved in Derrida’s reconceptualization of democracy in 
terms of infinite perfectibility, free speech, and the non-groundedness of the symbolic space of 
democratic identity-formation, are epitomized by what he calls a “categorical imperative” of the 
event or of experience.21 Derrida says:  
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The happening of the event is what cannot and should not be prevented: it is another name for the 
future itself. Not that it is good – good in itself – that everything or anything should happen; nor 
that we should give up trying to prevent certain things from coming to pass (in that case there 
would be no choice, no responsibility, no ethics or politics). But you do not try to oppose events 
unless you think they shut off the future, or carry a threat of death….22 
 
Notice how Derrida moves from the structural impossibility of closure (‘cannot be 
prevented’) to the normative claim that such closure ought not be prevented. In the face of this 
move, and given the structural homology of the ontological (better: quasi-transcendental) and the 
normative, political level, we must wonder how we are to understand their relation. Derrida at 
times seems to suggest a rather strong relationship, as in the above passage (which suggests that 
what cannot be avoided must not be avoided). Even if we do not expect any unquestionable 
foundations for values, or any rational necessity to lead from a quasi-transcendental account to 
moral and political affirmations, it seems fair to ask why a normative call to openness to the 
event, and everything that implies for democratic practice, should be linked to, or even follow 
from, the ineluctable exposure of any identity and meaning to a structurally open-ended 
repetition from the future.  
 
IV 
To my knowledge, Derrida nowhere presents an argument for why we ought to be open to the 
future to come in any detail. However, in a quasi-transcendental fashion (whose ‘quasi’ would 
have to be carefully explicated), Derrida does argue that openness to the future is the condition 
of possibility of the event, of identity, of decision, responsibility, hospitality, and in general the 
relation to the other, concepts that make up the normative commitments of democracy to come. 
The identity of a responsible subject, as well as the event of decision, is established only by way 
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of a productive and differential repetition from an open-ended future. This future in turn installs 
an originary otherness, a certain undecidability, in the very fabric of identity and the event. Every 
‘subject’ and every moment in time has always already been opened to the other (that is, to 
otherness in general, as manifested, for instance, by personal others). So the event of decision as 
well as agency and identity are not possible without the absolute futurity of time. It is both the 
condition of possibility as well as the condition of impossibility, of the conditioned in its 
metaphysical or traditional purity: while it makes the presence of subjectivity and of every 
moment in time possible, it also introduces an originary otherness that renders this presence 
unstable and compromised, shot through with an absence that, Derrida claims with Heidegger, 
the Western tradition, including the tradition of political thought, forgot to think.  
Relying on this account, one could try to utilize an argument whose formal structure is 
used frequently today in ethical and political contexts: from Martha Nussbaum’s resuscitation of 
Aristotle’s argument that human beings are social beings, to Alan Gewirth’s claim that human 
action presupposes a conception of oneself as free, and, of course, to Jürgen Habermas’s and 
Karl-Otto Apel’s transcendental pragmatics of language.23 This formal structure may be 
represented as follows: if doing (x) presupposes or is made possible by (y), everyone doing (x) 
must be committed to affirm (y). In Derrida, this structure would be filled with the following 
content: given that futural openness makes every identity and decision possible, and is thus  
presupposed in the very effort to close it, an attempt (always doomed to failure) to forego, 
neglect, or close off this future involves a (performative) self-contradiction. Therefore, we ought 
to affirm that which makes our identity, subjectivity, and agency possible. Assuming for the 
moment that the notions of ‘presupposition’ or of ‘making possible’ – the question of quasi-
 17 
transcendentality – as well as of ‘commitment’ could be fleshed out satisfactorily, this argument 
still requires for its validity the value of the logic of contradiction. 
However, it is very doubtful that deconstruction could avail itself of this type of argument 
championed by Habermas and, above all, by Apel. For, to cover a lot of ground very quickly, 
Derrida and others have deconstructed precisely the idea of a subject that would be so sovereign 
to language that it could be held responsible for its effects.24 And one of the effects of language 
is precisely that it makes contradictions inevitable. That is why one of Derrida’s most central 
proposals in the area of ethical and political ideas is the inevitability of aporias, paradoxes, and 
contradictions, an insight that leads Derrida to claim an ‘originary violence’ as part and parcel of 
the condition of human finitude. More to the point of democracy, Derrida emphasizes that the 
experience of aporias and contradictions (of what he calls the ‘impossible’ or undecidability) is 
inescapable in every decision that is not merely ‘programmed.’ The reason for the inescapability 
of this aporia lies in the quasi-transcendental conditions of identity themselves, for they are, as I 
indicated a moment ago, also conditions of impossibility. The establishment of identity requires 
the repetition of the same, but repetition can only be repetition in difference, or repetition from 
an open future.25 While this future is entirely indeterminate, by way of repetition it inserts us into 
specific contexts that project determinate horizons of the future. According to this argument, 
then, we cannot not project horizons that close the future, but we also cannot avoid the 
fundamental weakness and instability of such horizons, that is, their necessary non-closure. To 
establish identity, we need to project future horizons of meaning and repeat what we have 
inherited, but such repetition, in the same movement, opens up the horizons to the absolute 
future. In other words, repetition from the open future makes identity possible, but also again and 
again undermines it. 
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Following Levinas’s notion of the other as present and absent at the same time – a (non)-
phenomenon that, Derrida noted as early as 1964, contests the logic of non-contradiction26 – 
Derrida has demonstrated the inevitability of contradictions in several ethical and political 
concepts, which then have to be complicated in order to allow us to take this radical otherness 
into account. Perhaps this demonstration is most accessible in the notion of hospitality, a notion 
embodying the normative commitments of democracy to come.27 In the same way that the 
relation to the future demands both horizons of awaiting and the openness beyond all such 
horizons (i.e., the future to come), the ethical relation to the other requires both limits of 
acceptability and a limitless openness. Derrida describes this contradictory injunction as the 
reciprocal co-determination and co-implication of conditional and unconditional hospitality. If 
hospitality means openness to the other as other, the imposition of conditions for her or his 
acceptance – including the demand that the other be identifiable, give his or her name, and speak 
the language of the host – seems to compromise the hyperbolic demand for unconditional 
hospitality and inflict a certain kind of violence on the other. On the other hand, such violence is 
unavoidable, for without conditions of hospitality, there is no reciprocity and equality between 
host and guest,28 the other cannot be granted the equal legal rights of all guests or foreigners, and 
hospitality cannot be institutionalized and translated into a “concrete politics and ethics” as 
demanded, for example, by democracy’s infinite perfectibility.29 Furthermore, hospitality 
presupposes sovereignty and power over a house or home – a power and a “law of private 
property”30 whose institution, that is, whose initial introduction and maintenance, can hardly be 
thought without some degree of violence. This power is itself violent in having to exclude some 
potential guests in favor of others, but its granting of unconditional hospitality to all would also 
undermine itself, partly because the guest may always turn out to be a parasite.31 Thus, 
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unconditional hospitality calls for conditions, and conditional hospitality, to be true to its 
meaning and avoid the rigidification of a good conscience, calls for unconditional hospitality.32 
These and similar considerations lead Derrida to conclude that an “ethics of hospitality” is 
“limited and contradictory a priori.”33 In other texts, Derrida extends this claim to all obligations 
and injunctions, claiming that they are always contradictory and inevitably lead us into a double 
bind.34 
As the case of hospitality shows, a significant part of Derrida’s contribution to ethical and 
political thought consists of insights into unavoidable contradictions besetting its concepts and 
injunctions. What, then, are the inevitable contradictions of democracy, the ones that are to be 
brought to the fore by the concept of ‘democracy to come’? Where is the ineluctable alternation 
between future horizons and their openness and undecidability, an aporetic alternation that 
remains forever to be negotiated? The first aporia Derrida mentions is a transfer of hospitality to 
the ‘people’: democracy, Derrida claims, requires the definition of members and territory, and 
hence borders, but also requires hospitality to the foreigner.35 The second aporia again concerns 
the notions of equality and singularity. When making democratic decisions we cannot avoid 
affirming the equality (and hence, to some degree, the sameness) of all juridical subjects, while 
at the same time concerning ourselves with the singularity of each.36 Thirdly, we must calculate 
majorities in a democracy (unless we suppose that deliberation brings about unanimous 
consensus), but majority rule always threatens minorities and their rights – the uneasy alliance of 
democracy and liberalism.37 In the face of these aporias, the point for Derrida is not to avoid 
contradiction, but to experience the aporia in order to invent a new rule each time: openness to 
the future implies decision and invention. All sedimented institutional structures and social 
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relations are exposed to an open future that recovers their contingency, the moment of decision, 
and their democratic negotiability. 
As this discussion shows, by foregrounding ineluctable contradictions, deconstruction 
cannot – and perhaps Derrida never intended to – argue that we ought to affirm openness because 
it is presupposed in our own identity. Since Derrida shows that these presuppositions are 
themselves – and necessarily, at a quasi-transcendental, ‘a priori’ level – at odds with one 
another, the subject cannot be held responsible for, and be asked to avoid, their contradiction. 
Normative openness is thus intrinsically connected to inevitable self-contradictions, and part of 
the poignancy of insisting on it is to emphasize the necessity of negotiating the contradictory 
injunctions, the aporetic openness, the relation of identity and difference. My point here is that 
even if we grant that all particular affirmations, all particular promises with definite content, and 
all performativity have always already affirmed the differential repetition from the future to 
come that makes them possible38 – in the same way that all questioning has always already 
affirmed language and the workings of différance, as Derrida argues with Heidegger39 – this still 
does not mean that we ought to be open to the future to come. Unless we mean not that we ought 
to welcome the other and the future unconditionally, but only that we ought to recognize and be 
aware of aporias, and it is this latter idea that I will now explore further. 
 
V 
Despite the failure to justify futural openness normatively, uncovering inevitable contradictions 
in ethical and political decisions and institutions seems to be a pragmatically useful insight, one 
that has been put to work in largely non-normative analyses of democratic practices.40 So even if 
Derrida’s arguments for normative openness failed – and we will consider another attempt at 
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justification momentarily – democracy to come could still be a politically important and 
revealing category. It would be incumbent upon deconstruction to show that the rewriting of 
democracy as democracy to come can help us tackle issues that democracy faces today. And 
Derrida has certainly tried to show the usefulness of a deconstructive understanding of time and 
space to contemporary political changes. Among these challenges, we could name the 
virtualization of power and identity by new tele- and media-technologies and the concomitant 
erosion of the link between power and space; the internationalization of politics and the 
questioning of all natural and national borders the necessary excess, non-totalizability, or 
constitutive outside of every democratic community41; and, of course, the proper interpretation 
and response to the waning of the metaphysical foundations of democracy, and the resulting 
emptiness of its site of power. In regard to such problems, deconstruction could yield a revealing 
analysis. Furthermore, uncovering the aporias affecting democratic decision-making could alert 
us to unavoidable contradictions and thus help us to avoid possible pitfalls. This latter thought  
returns us to the question of whether normative openness can be justified after all. 
If Derrida’s uncovering of inherent contradictions and originary violence at the heart of 
the human condition rules out normative recourse to the notion of performative contradiction, it 
may also suggests a way out. For the point of insisting on aporias and (not primarily physical but 
‘originary’) violence is not a postmodern pleasure in paradoxes, or, even worse, a gay and 
irresponsible nihilism. Rather, the point is to complicate ethical life beyond the (always too 
quick) demands of good conscience, to demand that one question oneself while or before 
questioning others, to insist on the tragic dimension of political life and the need to negotiate 
ultimately irreconcilable obligations.42 Thus, in an effort to defend Derrida’s normative claims, 
we could consider the political analysis in terms of the promise, différance, iterability, etc., as 
 22 
outlining an ethics and a politics of what Derrida, in “Violence and Metaphysics,” called the 
“lesser violence.”43 The difficulties of first defining and then measuring violence are, of course, 
enormous, especially in light of Derrida’s account of originary violence, and the aporia of 
undecidability. Provided these difficulties could somehow be met, and further presupposing that 
unnecessary violence is to be avoided, the attempt to close horizons of the future – that is, to 
establish a political identity devoid of the need for a repetition from the future and, thus, political 
(democratic and open-ended) negotiation – could be shown to be needlessly violent, given that 
identity and future horizons cannot ever be closed. The passage from a quasi-transcendental 
account to normative claims would then consist in the idea that we ought to refrain from trying to 
do what is quasi-transcendentally impossible (e.g., a closed political field, identity without 
relation to otherness), for the attempt to accomplish the impossible would produce “absolute 
evil” or the worst violence.44 In other words, quasi-transcendental impossibilities only call for 
their recognition in view of a politics of the lesser violence. 
I cannot be certain that Derrida would subscribe to this argument, though it has been 
advanced, and attributed to Derrida, by some of his commentators,45 and can be reconstructed 
from several Derridean passages. We should not underestimate the difficulties of this 
consequentialist46 argument, nor should we be mistaken about its scope, about what it can and 
cannot justify. While it can justify the call for a recognition of originary violence, aporias, and 
contradictions – aporias that result precisely from openness at the quasi-transcendental level – in 
order to help reduce violence and invent a new relation to the singular situation, it cannot, I 
believe, justify the normative claim that this reduction of violence is, in all contexts, achieved by 
unconditional hospitality and openness to the future to come. Such a claim cannot be decided 
universally in theory, as Derrida appears to suggest when he names unconditional hospitality a 
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“regulative idea.”47 Let me explain why a universal openness to the future to come and to the 
personal other does not follow, and why we ought to distinguish here between this normative 
openness, and justifiable openness as an awareness or recognition of aporias. 
According to the second argument, it seems, openness to the future and to the other is 
normatively required because it reduces violence in all contexts. However, both structural 
considerations regarding futural openness as well as unconditional hospitality, and pragmatic 
considerations regarding the singularity of the situation lead us to doubt this universality. Not 
only conditions placed on the other, but also unconditional hospitality can lead to unavoidable 
violence in breaking with conditional and juridicalized hospitality, and in its tendency to 
undermine itself. For this reason, it is doubtful that the (quasi-transcendentally necessary) 
openness that characterizes subjectivities and the political field can give rise to the Kantian 
‘regulative idea’ of unconditional hospitality, and that this idea can universally orient, in what 
Derrida calls a “progressive movement,” the conditions and limits placed on openness to the 
other.48 If ‘progress’ means, in line with this interpretation, the reduction of violence, it cannot 
be guaranteed in advance for all contexts that the violence resulting from unconditional 
hospitality is less than the one resulting from conditional hospitality, laws, institutions, rights, 
and so on. As Derrida indicates at times, the lesser violence can largely be determined only after 
the fact, après coup, after an institution has been inaugurated or a decision made. This 
uncertainty follows precisely from the ineluctable openness and incalculability of the future on 
which he insists: it is obviously paradoxical to suggest openness to the future beyond expectation 
as a norm on the basis of the calculation of the future effects of an action. As Derrida himself 
admits, whether deconstructive affirmation of the future to come ‘succeeds’ “could never be the 
object of knowledge or of certainty.”49 Such inescapable affirmation may, then, strive to be open 
 24 
to the future in the sense of being attuned to the singular situation and its aporetic demands: 
“Every action and every political decision ought to invent its norm or its rule.”50 This invention 
may aim at the reduction of violence, but it cannot be asked to always aim at unconditional 
hospitality and openness to the other and to the future in the normative sense. 
Geoffrey Bennington, who has advanced this second interpretation of Derrida’s ethics – 
although he also appears to maintain what I have analyzed as the argument from non-
contradiction – has recognized this paradox, but still thinks it possible to hold on to “something 
like the categorical imperative in terms of a ‘lesser violence in an economy of violence.’”51 Due 
to this paradox, Derrida is more consistent when he claims that the aporias and “internal 
contradictions” besetting unconditional hospitality render its regulative idea inaccessible not only 
for empirical, but for structural reasons.52 Thus, we should draw a conclusion Derrida does not 
appear to draw: openness to the other and to the future cannot be stipulated as a normative, 
regulative idea with universal reach. If invention is to be truly inventive and attuned to 
singularity, it cannot be limited in advance by a regulative idea, even if the regulative idea is 
precisely the idea of unconditional openness. For the idea of giving a criterion for the absence or 
relative lack of criteria is not only paradoxical, it limits the possibility of choice. Rather, political 
invention must be open to decide against openness: surely, there are singular situations where 
openness to the other is inadvisable, where a reduction of violence is to be expected not from 
unconditional hospitality but from (further) conditions, demands, and normative expectations 
placed on the other, and where political planning, as the projection of horizons, advances 
democratic hopes – even if such expectations and horizons must, for structural as well as 
normative reasons, themselves remain subject to repetition from the future to come. 
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If the insistence on aporia cast doubt on the first, transcendental-pragmatic argument, it 
decreases the reach of the second, consequentialist argument for la moindre violence. It forces us 
to make a distinction between the awareness of aporias – for only such awareness gives us the 
chance to reduce violence – and the response to such an awareness, namely, unconditional 
hospitality to the other and a welcome extended to the pluralizing, differentializing work of the 
repetition from the future. That the ineluctable work of differential repetition casts us into 
aporias that we ought to recognize in view of the lesser violence does not, I believe, amount to an 
ethics of openness to the future to come and to the personal other, unless all we mean by 
normative openness is a disposition that allows us to recognize these aporias. It might be the case 
in some singular situations that openness to the future and unconditional hospitality generate the 
least violence, but it is not very difficult, as Derrida appears to recognize, to imagine situations in 
which this openness would tend to produce greater violence. Hence, we may be called upon to be 
so open as to recognize an ethico-political impasse and avoid neglecting the conflicting ethical 
demands of, say, care and equal justice (to use Gilligan’s terms), or an unconditional gift to the 
other and the demands of the third party (to use Levinas’s terms), but whether the violence-
reducing response to such recognition will lie on the side of unconditional hospitality can only be 
decided from within the situation. 
All this goes to show, I think, that thinking of ethics and politics in terms of aporia, and 
insisting on singularity, may be useful and even necessary, but they also disallow universal 
normative recommendations on their own terms. Derrida may argue, however, that the absence 
of an opening, the contentment with existing conditions and institutions, and the failure to 
recognize ineluctable aporias, can, and often does, lead to a violence that can be reduced by the 
ethical demand for unconditional hospitality and openness to the future. Given the (quasi-
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transcendental) impossibility of closing political identities and structures once and for all, the 
attempt to do so may be expected to generate unnecessary violence. The ethical call cannot be 
that we must keep institutions and democratic political structures open on pain of their ultimate 
closure, for such ultimate closure is as little possible, according to the quasi-transcendental 
argument, as complete openness. Rather, the call only attempts to bring to our awareness this 
space of aporetic negotiability, and reactivates the democratic possibilities at the heart of all 
frontiers, politically relevant distinctions, and sedimented structures. If we presuppose that in an 
economy of originary violence, violence is to be reduced, Derrida can legitimately argue that this 
democratic space of contestation as well as of invention is normatively demanded. The Derridian 
concept of democracy to come calls for the back and forth, the undecidability that often only 
results if we experience or admit the hyperbolic call to absolute openness and unconditional 
hospitality to the singular other.  
So there is a modicum of a normative link between ‘democracy’ and the ‘to come.’53 
Derrida’s argument, as reconstructed here, is that openness to the future and to the other reduces 
violence in preventing that which the quasi-transcendental account revealed as impossible (such 
as the closure of political structures, ahistorical norms, and the like). Such openness is best 
exhibited by a reformulated version of an inherited form of political organization and experience, 
to wit, a democracy that emphasizes free speech and openness to criticism without 
unquestionable foundations or extra-political (‘natural’) norms, openness to the plurality of 
identity-formation, and the awareness of ineluctable aporias. The future to come introduces into 
democratic organization the post-humanist insight that, despite the absence of extra-political 
(theological or natural) instances and non-inherited moral standards guaranteeing order, the 
political cannot be reduced to, or exhausted by, the merely human. Since all political 
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organization and institutionalization is marked by an excess of time, by a constitutive outside or 
remainder, by a radical otherness Derrida has named the messianic promise, we ought not to 
attempt to a closure or reduction that might be expected to produce unnecessary violence.54 
 
VII 
To conclude, I would like to use the ‘example’ of democracy’s relation to ‘free’ markets to 
express my concern that a normatively distinguished futural openness might be misunderstood so 
that it may be taken to justify capitalist markets. Such a justification, I believe, would be 
unwarranted. When it comes to the relation between democracy and the capitalist market, 
Derrida at times advocates state intervention and regulation, and at other times affirms the 
openness, pluralization, and flexibility of production and consumption markets allegedly bring.55 
In order to prevent closure of the socio-political field, in this case by economic accumulation of 
capital and power, and in order to keep multiplying democratic possibilities, Derrida advocates 
state intervention in, and regulation of, markets. At the same time, however, he argues that the 
logic of the state might fall into nationalism, protectionism, and an over-regulation of the market 
that would in turn (unnecessarily) limit the possibilities of the future. So the task, as Derrida sees 
it, is not only to be open to the future and multiply its possibilities, but to understand that no rule 
(e.g., for or against state regulation) will tell us in advance what course of action opens the 
future, and that openness to the future requires the ordeal of undecidability and the invention of 
new rules. 
While Derrida thus leaves it up to the particular situation to determine which course of 
action is best, what is best is here determined in terms of the openness to the future to come, 
what Derrida calls, in this context, a “categorical imperative” that asks us “to leave the future to 
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the future [laisser de l’avenir à l’avenir]… to leave open the possibility of the future and, 
therefore, to negotiate between rhythms so that, at the very least, this opening is not saturated.”56 
Here, the normatively desirable outcome is not determined with regard to a reduction of 
violence, but with regard to the open future to come. In the discussion of capitalist markets, 
insisting upon openness to the future might be taken to justify the wide-spread economic 
insecurity which, as a result of neo-liberal policies and so-called ‘globalization,’ affects so many 
today. 57 Of course, we may try to oppose, with Derrida, the deconstructive insistence upon an 
indeterminable and incalculable future to the future calculations of profitability required by 
economic exchange and investment. However, the overall result of many ‘private’ calculations, 
as Marx demonstrated, is an overall incalculability of market effects, leading to largely 
unforeseeable economic crises on the micro- as well as the macro-levels. To avoid the 
implication that a quasi-transcendental as well as normative affirmation of futural openness 
welcomes the, on principle, avoidable economic insecurities of capitalist markets, it is necessary 
to insist that such openness can be normatively distinguished only in the sense of an aporetic  
space of invention that affords us the chance to reduce violence.  In this context, it would be 
more important to reveal the aporetic relation between markets and democracy, rather than to 
underline that the market is not the enemy of democracy.58 The recognition of aporias in view of 
the lesser violence might lead us to a sharper understanding of the conflict between economic 
exigencies and political democracy, between equality and freedom, but it would not necessarily 
affirm markets in line with futural openness, precisely because markets may generate greater 
violence. While the dangers of normalization and social uniformity need to be recognized in 
favoring greater economic equality, a reduction of violence might, in many cases, precisely result 
from the latter as well as from greater economic security and stable political institutions. 
 29 
Derrida may relate the two different goals – reduction of violence and futural openness – 
by arguing that worse violence would be generated by the attempt to close the future, an 
argument that, as I have indicated, may be acceptable provided we can define the elusive term 
‘violence’ sufficiently for given contexts. But it does not follow that openness can be 
normatively distinguished as an intrinsic goal in the sense of, say, the dissemination on which 
deconstruction insists. If the aporias of democracy, and more generally of ethical and political 
life, demand a space for the inventiveness of possible responses to such aporias, such 
inventiveness in turn calls for the leeway of democratic negotiability, but it does not seem to 
require a positive valuation of economic uncertainties, or the flexibility of production and 
consumption allegedly afforded by capitalist markets. Surely, as Derrida argues against Marx’s 
call for the “end of the political” that would also be an “end of the spectral” and of futural 
otherness,59 the abolition of ‘free’ markets in favor of state planning may be inspired by a 
political imaginary that neglects the ineradicable internal differentiations and alterity of ‘the 
people’ or ‘the proletariat’ brought about by repetition from the future to come and the non-
closure it introduces into such concepts. However, whether state planning of the economy, for 
example, leads to a greater violence than the economic insecurity, inequality, and curtailment of 
freedom the markets require, would have to remain an open question. 
Derrida’s democracy to come, then, is still insufficiently theorized and balanced to take 
account of (the limits of) its own normativity, especially in regard to the indispensable value of 
democratic equality as it conditions freedom, popular sovereignty, as well as the pluralization of 
creative possibilities for responsive action, as favored by Derrida.60 Even if we prize 
pluralization above all, both economic and political equality may be said to contribute, to a 
considerable extent, to its flourishing. As Foucault has demonstrated, the deployment of 
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normalizing disciplines was (and is) needed in part to support the perpetual economic ‘growth’ 
of the market and to sustain its inequalities. And further, the large inequalities ‘free’ markets, in 
their current form, bring also generate competitiveness, disaffection, intolerance, and social 
violence, perhaps especially – or more recognizably (a problem of unequal access to mainstream 
media) – on the part of the dispossessed and downtrodden. This drives the spiral of violence in 
the direction of more disciplinary power in democratic institutions, especially more prisons, as 
William Connolly, for one, has shown.61 However, both Connolly and Derrida seem to value 
equality and economic equalization only to the extent that it allows more ‘critical 
responsiveness’ or ‘agonistic respect’ (in Connolly’s terms) or ‘openness’ and ‘hospitality’ (in 
Derrida’s terms), not as a value in itself. Not only is such openness in danger of neglecting one 
of the at least nominally constitutive features of the concepts of democracy we have inherited, 
but its normativity remains difficult to justify, in Connolly as much as in Derrida.62 
I think such problems – the lack of an account of equality and its value, the difficulty of 
justifying normative openness to the future to come, the weakness of its connection with 
democracy on the basis of the reduction of violence alone – indicate the precariousness of  
attempts to affirm and reconceive democracy without engaging, at the conceptual level, the 
normativity of freedom, equality, popular sovereignty, community, and individual rights, values 
that have historically been sedimented in democratic institutions. The difficulties might thus 
stem from a selective reinterpretation that affirms the condition of inheritance of these values, 
and sees them primarily in the light of their futurally open-ended historicity. These difficulties 
might be met, for instance – as Bernard Stiegler and Richard Beardsworth have pointed out in 
different contexts63 – by a more genealogical perspective that accounts for these values and 
explicates the asserted link, including its normative dimension, between democracy and radical 
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futurity, thereby supplementing the primarily conceptual operation we find in Derrida’s writings. 
If we do not understand futural openness as valuing what Walter Benjamin called the ‘logic of 
the new’ per se, I see no reason why such a perspective should be at odds with the 
transcendental, future-opening historicity on which Derrida insists. 
It becomes clear, then, that the various metaphysical foundations of democracy attempted 
to capture and justify what seems not altogether dispensable to democratic practices: the 
normativity of popular sovereignty, equal liberty, and human rights (among other things). 
Modernity is not only an invalidation of the normative content of tradition and religion, and an 
affirmation of the open-endedness of the future, but must also be viewed as an attempt to 
translate and reformulate those normative contents. These translations and reformulations have 
made their way into the concept of democracy Derrida wishes to inherit. Such an inheritance 
must, I believe, capture and negotiate these normative contents. Precisely insofar as Derrida’s 
futural historicity insists, against much of modernity’s self-understanding, on the complex 
inseparability of tradition and religion, on the one hand, and the affirmation of the future, on the 
other, a fuller genealogical account of the inherited normative contents is indispensable. Derrida 
is correct to point out that such negotiation does well to reflect on the conditions of historicity 
under which it operates, for such conditions provide both its space of possibility and the aporias 
and demands to be negotiated. In other words, they make democratic negotiations possible and 
render their harmonious and final solution impossible – in favor of the invention of new norms in 
singular circumstances. In this sense, futural openness may function as a transcendental ‘meta-
norm’ that subjects all normative accounts of democracy to perpetual revision and contestability 
from the viewpoint of elusive singularity, in the interest of reducing the violence that might 
otherwise result from such accounts. However, the specification of democracy’s conditions of 
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possibility will be one-sided if it leaves out the normativity that still calls for explication, 
especially the values, such as equality, that Derrida recognizes but does not elaborate.64 Whether 
such normativity requires an extra-political or a universal foundation in order to be furthered in 
the ‘unfinished project of modernity’ has, I believe, been rendered doubtful by the Derridian 
understanding of futural historicity, but it remains equally doubtful that this “other historicity” 
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